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MINORITY 'UNIONISM: EXCLUSIVE RECOGNITION,
CONDITIONAL RECOGNITION, AND MEMBERS-ONLY
RECOGNITION IN LIGHT OF THE GARMENT WORKERS
RULE
INTRODUCTION
In International Ladies Garment Workers Union v. NLRB,' the
United States Supreme Court reaffirmed the general proposition that an
employer's exclusive recognition of a union which represented a mi-
nority of the employees in the appropriate bargaining unit was an un-
fair labor practice that violated sections 8(a) (1) and 8(a) (2) of the
National Labor Relations Act.2 The rule was deemed a necessary conse-
quence of the employees' basic freedom to choose a bargaining repre-
sentative, as guaranteed by section 7 of the Act.'
In the eight years since the Garment Workers decision, the National
Labor Relations Board and the courts have applied the rule broadly in
a variety of representation controversies arising under section 8(a) (2)
of the Act, and in a number of other unfair labor practice situations
treated under section 8(a) (5) of the Act.4 The Board has also relied
on the Garment Workers rule in altering its view of the legality of
1. 366 U.S. 731 (1960), aff'g 280 F.2d 616 (D.C. Cir. 1960), enforcing sub nor.,
Bernhard-Altmann Texas Corp., 122 N.L.R.B. 1289 (1959). [The Supreme Court
decision is hereinafter referred to as Garment Workers.]
2. §8. (a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer-
1) to interfere with restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of
the rights guaranteed in §7.
2) to dominate or interfere with the formation or administration of
any labor organization or contribute financial or other support
to it
61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §158(a)(i)-(2) (1964). The acceptance of exclusive
recognition status was held to constitute an unfair labor practice by the union, in
violation of 8(b) (1) (A), of the Act. 61 Stat. 142 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §158(b) (1) (A)
(1964).
3. §7 provides, in relevant part, that:
[e]mployees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or
assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives
of their own choosing and shall also have the right to refrain from
any or all of such activities.
61 Star. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1964).
4. "§8 (a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer to refuse to bargain




"conditional representation" contracts.5 The articulation and interpreta-
ton of the rule has also raised serious doubt as to the continued validity
of the once-popular "members-only" representation agreements.
The purpose of this discussion is three-fold. First, it traces the de-
velopment and application of the Garment Workers rule as espoused
in cases arising under sections 8(a) (2) and 8(a) (5) of the Act, noting
limitations and exceptions placed upon the rule due to. conflicts with
other goals basic to national labor relations policy 7 Second, the oper-
ation of the rule in relation to "conditional representation" contracts is
explored, with emphasis upon their resultant validity or invalidity Also,
'members-only" contracts are measured against the Garment Workers
rule in an attempt to determine their present viability Finally, a pro-
posal is presented whereby members-only recognition can be applied,
within the letter and spirit of the Garment Workers rule, as a remedial
device to further the basic organizational rights of employees.
APPLICATION OF THE Garment Workers RULE f N 8 (a) (2) CASES
In Garment Workers, the Court for the first time found an employer
to be in violation of section 8 (a) (2) for rendering exclusive recognition
to a minority union without in fact having "dominated or interfered"
with the union's formation or administration." The unfair act of the
employer, committed in initial labor relations dealings with a union,
was based on a misplaced good-faith belief that the umon actually
represented a majority of the employees. The Court relied heavily upon
NLRB v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines9 a decision in which the
section 8(a) (2) violation was predicated upon actual control of a
local union created and thereafter dominated by the employer.10 This
5. See, Majestic Weaving Co., 147 N.L.R.B. 859 (1964), enforcement refused on
other grounds, 355 F.2d 854 (2d Cir. 1966)
6. International Ladies Garment Workers Union v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 731, 742 (1960)
(Douglas, J., dissenting).
7. An obvious illustration of such a conflict, resolved by statute and contained in
§8(f) (1) of the Act, 61 Star. 121, 29 U.S.C. §158(f) (1)' (1964) concerns the negation
of the majority requirement for representation in the 'building trades industry Due
to the transitory nature of employment patterns and the accompanying jurisdictional
disagreements among unions, exclusive representation is allowed absent a showing of
majority support. See, Alton-Wood River Building and Construction Trades Council,
144 N.L.R.B. 260, 262-63 (1963), §8(a) (2), 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §157 (1964)
8. 29 U.S.C. §158(a) (2) (1964).
9. 303 U.S. 261, 267 (1938).
10. To illustrate the frequent linkage of employer domination with minority umon
exclusive recognition, see, Pittsburgh Metal Lithoiraphing Co., 158 N.L.R.B. 1126
(1966); Milco Undergarment Co, 106 N.L.R.B. 767 (1953), enforced, 212 F.2d 801
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distinction, however, was not noted with any degree of precision by
the Court in Garment Workers,"' since the employer's interference
with his employees' freedom of choice was attributed solely to the
fact that the union lacked majority support at the time of recognition.'
(3d Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 888 (1954). See also NLRB v. Philamon Labora-
tories, Inc., 298 F.2d 176 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 919 (1962); Chicago
Rawhide Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 221 F.2d 165 (7th Cir. 1955).
11. The Court held that the employer's "good faith" in extending premature recog-
rtion was immaterial, there being no element of scienter needed to sustain a §8(a) (2)
violation, due to the overriding harm done to prejudice the employees' basic right
of self-determination in selecting a bargaining representative. The court concluded
that
[t]o countenance such an excuse would place in permissibly careless
employer and union hands the power to completely frustrate employee
realization of the premise of the Act-that its prohibition will go far
to assure freedom of choice and majority rule in employee selection
of representatives. 366 U.S. 731, 738-39 (1961).
As to the sufficiency of "good faith" as a defense to unfair labor practice charges
under §8(a) (2), see NLRB v. Burnup and Sims, Inc., 379 U.S. 21, 24 (1964); Welch
Scientific Co. v. NLRB, 340 F.2d 199, 203 (2d Cir. 1965)
The Board had earlier examined the "good faith" argument in Garment Workers
and, without renouncing its availability as a defense (which the Supreme Court later
did), found it wanting in the particular case. The Board held that since neither the
company nor the union had taken "reasonable precautions" (as by the comparing
of authorization cards against the employer's payroll) to ascertain whether the union
actually had a majority at the tune of recognition, the defense did not apply 122
N.L.R.B. 1289, 1292 (1959) See also International Metal Products Co., 104 N.L.R.B.
1076, 1077 (1953).
12. The fact that the union did manage to obtain majority employee support by
the date that the formal collective bargaining agreement was executed and put into
effect was also deemed irrelevant. The earlier wrongful exclusive recognition was
viewed as a "fait accompli," allowing the union "a marked advantage over any other
in securing the adherence of the employees," 366 U.S. 731, 736 (1961), quoting in
part from NLRB v. Greyhound Lines, 303 U.S. 261, 267 (1938). Thus, it as unnecessary
to show that the union's success in later obtaining a majority was influenced by the
prior recognition; " the impropriety lies in its possible, rather than its actual,
effect." C.C.H. GuiDanOOK TO LABOR RELATIONS § 614 (1967).
The Court, earlier in the same term had foreshadowed the outcome of Garment
Workers by declaring that a union-security clause, negotiated as a part of an
exclusive bargaining contract at a time when the union represented less than a
majority, would have been voided if the action had not been barred by the ap-
plicable statute of limitations. See Machinists' Local 1424 v. NLRB, 362 U.S. 411
(1960) Actually, a series of earlier decisions found violations of §§8(a)(1) and
8(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. §§158(a)(1)-(2) (1964), when an employer either recognized,
bargained, or contracted with a union lacking majority status. The presence of other
"aggravating factors" m these cases, not found in Garment Workers, such as the
concurrent organizational efforts of another union or the inclusion of a union security
clause in the contract, more clearly justified the result. See, e.g., Dixie Bedding Mfg.
Co. v. NLR, 268 F.2d 901 (5thCir. 1959); District 50, UMW v. NLRB, 234 F.2d 565
(4th Cir. 1956); United Transports, Inc., 123 N.L.RB. 668 (1959).
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The general rule has since been applied by both the labor. board and
the courts in a variety of other section 8 (a) (2) situations where actual
control or domination by the employer of the recognized union were
also absent. Thus, an unfair labor practice was found in Lively. Photos,
Inc. and Waldorf Pen C&., 13 where the umon's majority status at the
time of recognition was partially achieved through apparently mad-
vertent solicitation by an office employee of the signatures of other
employees on union membership application forms designed for later
use by prospective employees. The disallowance in Garment Workers
of good faith as an employer defense under section 8(a) (2) virtually
dictated this result due to the otherwise elementary aspects of the case.
More ambiguous are those situations where the Garment Workers
rule has been used to establish section 8(a) (2) violations by an em-
ployer who, when caught between two rival unions in an initial recogni-
tion situation, extends recognition in good faith to one of the rivals
without ascertaining that it actually possesses a majority In such a
situation, the offending employer would transgress the Garment Work-
ers rule. At the same time, his conduct may also fall within the Board's
Midwest Piping doctrine, which holds that an employer is guilty of an
8(a) (2) violation when he recognizes one of two competing umons
at a time when the representation question generated by the unions is
pending before the Board.'4 This occurred in NLRB v. Troschlr
where the employer in good faith recognized an independent employee
association, even though another union was picketing, while the Board
was in the process of determining the scope of the proper bargaining
unit.
Unfair labor practice charges under section 8(a) (2) have also been
sustained on the basis of the Garment Workers rule in "renewed recog-
13. 123 N..R.B. 1054 (1959). See also Jan Power, Inc., 173 N.L.R.B. - (No. 120), 69
L.R.R.M. 1477 (1968).
14. Midwest Piping and Supply Co., 63 NL.R.B. 1060 (1945). The Board held that
an employer faced with rival representation claims must maintain a strictly neutral
position and that the recognition of one of the rival unions, at a time when the
representation question was before the Board, constituted unlawful assistance in violation
of §8(a) (2). See also NLRB v. Signal Oil and Gas Co., 303 F.2d 785 (5th Cir. 1962).
The Midwest Piping rule has since been limited in the seventh circuit, however, by
an exception m which the employer is obliged to recognize one of the rival unions
where it presents "unmistakable evidence of majority support." NLRB v. Indianapolis
Newspapers, 210 F.2d 501 (7th Cir. 1954).
15. 138 NL.B. 215 (1962), enfoaced, 321 F.2d 692 (4th Cir. 1963), cert. dented,
375 U.S. 993 (1964). See also NLRB v. Park Edge Sheridan Meats, Inc., 139 NJ,.R.B.
748 (1962), enforced, 323 F.2d 956 (2d Cir. 1963).
1969)
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nition" cases. The rule was found particularly, applicable in Alco-
Gravure, Division of Publication Corp.,16 where 'the employer un-
laterally maintained an expired exclusive recognition agreement with a
union which no longer enjoyed majority support.
Although the circumstances in Alco-Gravure appear to justify the
result, the employer acting in good faith may find it difficult to avoid
violating the spirit, if not the letter, of that decision in situations where
the incumbent union, though no longer enjoying majority support,
seeks to maintain its bargaining position after contract expiration. This
danger becomes clear when seen in the light of two cases involving
decertified unions which apparently construct an implicit limitation
on the scope of the Garment Workers rule. In Douds v. Local 1280,1-
a minority union, after decertification, was deemed to have standing in
a grievance proceeding even though the majority of employees in the
bargaining unit had recognized another union with whom the employer
had already negotiated an agreement. In United States Gypsum Co v.
United Steelworkers,18 a similarly decertified union no longer repre-
senting a majority was given comparable standing. The Douds decision 9
rested upon a finding that the grievance sought to be adjusted lay out-
side the superseding collective bargaining agreement but within an
earlier agreement concluded by the decertified union. In United States
Gypsum the union's continued standing was based on the fact that the
substantive rights sought by the union arose under a legitimate con-
tract and had ripened into a form of relief which became "operative"
prior to decertification. ° The decision in United States Gypsum sug-
gests that the employer would be under a duty to deal with the de-
certified union regarding other matters originally negotiated with it,
even in the presence of a newly certified majority union. Thus, if the
range of subjects covered within this obligation were ever held to in-
elude such basic issues as wages, hours, and working conditions, the
relevance of the Garment Workers rule would be -even further ob-
scured.
16. 124 N.L.R.B. 1027 (1959) The remedy ordered therein, as in Gannent Workers
and most other exclusive minority representation cases, eonsisted of a cease and
desist order prohibiting the employer from recogmzmg the umon, and likewise pro-
hibitng the unlion from accepting such "recogmntion "until said labor organization
shall have demonstrated its exclusive majority representative status pursuant to a
Board-conducted election. " Id. at 1035.
17. 173 F.2d 764 (2d Cir. 1949)
18. 384 F.2d 38. (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1042. (1968).
19. 173 F.2d 764, 769 (2d Cir. 1949).
20. 384 F.2d 38, 45-46 (5th Cir. 1967)
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Another indication of possible lirmtations on the Garment Workers
rule in section 8 (a) (2) situations was revealed in the sixth circuit's
ruling in AIW Local 620 v. NLRB21 involving employer actions re-
garding the determination of appropriate bargaining units. The court
held that the employer committed an unfair labor practice by con-
tractually including employees in a new and separate plant in the exist-
mg bargaining unit, so as to place in doubt the validity of the employ-
er's recognition of the incumbent union due to the consequent dimunition
of the union's majority status. The AIW decision, however, was based
on other more empirical criteria, the court expressly disavowing the
use of the inflexible and mechanistic Garment Workers rule. Other
factors such as the existence of separate administrative units, degree of
functional mtegration, geographic distance and interchange of employ-
ees between plants were stressed in order to determine whether the
workers in the two plants possessed a sufficient "community of interest"
to justify the inclusion of the employees at the new plant in the existing
unit without their consent. 2
A final limitation to the scope of the Garment Workers rule. in section
8(a) (2) cases was engrafted in Keller Plastics Eastern, Inc.-3 where the
Board postponed application of the Garment Workers standard to al-
low a validly recognized union a "reasonable time" to exercise its man-
date, despite an intervening loss of majority support between recognition
and the date of execution of the bargaining agreement. Garment Work-
ers was distinguished i- Keller because the initial recogmnon extended
in the former was invalid, while in Keller it was not. The Keller rule
had since been broadened to exclude from the purview of Garment
Workers those representation cases where majority support has been
lost after a valid recognition but before the signing of a bargaining
contract.24
21. 375 F.2d 707 (6th Cir. 1967). See generally Garment Workers Local 57 v.
NLRB, 374 F.2d 295 (D.C. Cir. 1967), cert. dented, 387 U.S. 942 (1967). See also NLRB
v. Food Employer's Council, Inc., 399 F.2d 501 (9th Cit. 1968).
22. 375 F.2d 707, 711 (6th Cir. 1967).
23. 157 N..R.B. 583 (1966). See also NLRB v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 399
F.2d 409 (7th Cir. 1968);'N.J. MacDonald and Sons, 155 N.L.R.B. 67 (1965), where the
employer was found to be under a duty to bargain with a union despite its loss of a
majority shortly after concluding a settlement agreement with the employer.
24. See remarks of NLRB Member John Fanning, in 20 N.Y. CoNF. ON LAOR 7, 17
(1967), as quoted in 1967 LABOR RELATioNs YFaooK 210-11. A distinction has more
recently been made, however, in representation cases, between "substantiated" recog-
nution and "mere" recogition obtained without a proferred showing of majority sup-
port, apparently meaning that in the latter case an employer extending such recognition
1969]
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The GarmentWorkers rule thus covers many section 8(a) (2) situ-
ations, but is limited or excluded in others. An employer's interest in
following the rule in making recognition decisions cannot be over-
emphasized. Even though an employer is sincerely interested in the
stability of labor relations, he may wish to recognize a union only if
it displays unmistakable majority support, thus adopting a non-believer's
stance in the face of a union's proffered showing of a bare or con-
jectured majority Otherwise, he may find himself obliged to deal with
a union which will soon represent only a minority of his employees,
thus exposing him to the later organmational efforts of other unions with-
out relieving him fully of the duty to maintain bargaining relations with
the existing minority union.
THE Garment Workers RULE AND SECTION 8 (a) (5)
The Garment Workers rule has frequently been cited in cases where
the alleged employer unfair labor practice falls within the refusal-to-
bargain provision of section 8(a) (5) of the Act.25 Before the Garment
Workers decision, it was established that when a union had obtained
a majority, and the employer refused to bargain while not entertaining
a good-faith doubt of such majority,26 he was required to bargain after
an unfair labor practice charge was upheld. This had to occur even if
the union lost its majority status in the meantime, because the right of
may later refuse to bargain after the union's majority has dissipated through no fault
of his own. See Josephine Furniture Co, Inc., 172 N.L.R.B. - (No. 22), 68 L.R.R.M. 1311
(1968).
25. 29 U.S.C. §158(a) (5) (1958). Where an unfair labor practice is found against
an employer under this section of the Act, the Board's remedy is generally of an
affirnative nature, in the form of an order to the employer to bargain with the
aggrieved union.
26. Frank Bros. Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 702 (1944). See also NLRB v. Mexia Textile
Mills, Inc., 339 U.S. 563 (1950). For an explanation of the Board's concept of what
constitutes a lack of "good faith" on the part of an employer in §8(a) (5) proceedings,
see Aaron Brosal Co, 158 NL.R.B. 1077, 1079 (1966).
27. NLRB v. Kobritz, 193 F.2d 8 (1st Cir. 1951). See also Brooks v. NLRB, 348
U.S. 96 (1954) and Hexton Furniture Co., ill N..R.B. 342 (1955), where it was held
than an employer must continue to bargain with a union officially certified by the
Board under the provisions of §9(c) of the Act, 61 Stat. 143, 29 U.S.C. §159(c) (1964),
for the one-year period of certification despite the union's loss of majority support, or
the employer's good-faith doubt as to the continued existence of such support. This
result was necessary m order to impart stability to collective bargaining and to give
the union time to exercise its earlier mandate. Thus, absent unusual circumstances,
only formal decertification proceedings initiated under §9(e) (3) of the Act, 61 Stat.
143-144, 29 U.S.C. §159(e) (1964) is sufficient to deprive the union of its collective
bargaining status during the certification period.
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employees to bargain collectively is not conditioned upon antecedent
certificaton of the union by the Board under section 10(c) of the
Act. Although before Garment Workers it was held that the union
was obliged to make a showing of its majority status before the employer
was obligated to bargain,9 more emphasis has since been placed upon
the need for such a showing, at least in cases not involving an election.
That greater emphasis on proof of majority at the time recognition is
demanded, is undoubtedly due to a desire of the Board and the courts
to avoid a situation in which a umon would gain an advantage with
only minority support since such an act, if committed independently
by the employer, would result in a section 8(a) (2) violation. Thus,
the duty of the employer to bargain in a non-election case is said to
arise "only at such times as the union representative presents convincing
evidence of majority support." 80
This obligation of showing majority support also extends to the
Board's General Counsel when prosecuting a section 8 (a) (5) charge.31
The nature of the General Counsel's duty has been determined to con-
stitute a part of the burden of proof which, if not satisfied, results in
a dismissal of the charge without regard to an investigation into the
element of the employer's good faith doubt of the union's majority at
the time of his refusal to bargain.8 This burden of proof obligation was
given further dimension by the fifth circuit in Engineers and Fabricators,
Inc. v. NLRB.33 There it was ordered that when the General Counsel
attempts to satisfy the burden through the production of actual signed
authorization cards, and when the authenticity of the cards is challenged
by the employer's defense of good faith because of alleged misrepre-
sentations as to purpose made during their procurement, an additional
element is added to the General Counsel's burden of proof. In such a
situation, the .General Counsel must further show that the objective
28. 61 Star. 143-144, 29 U.S.C. §160(c) (1964).
29. See UMW v. Arkansas Oak Flooring Co., 351 U.S. 62, 69 (1956).
30. Edward Fields, Inc. v. NLRB, 325 F.2d 754, 761 (2d Cir. 1963). See also NLRB
v. Morris Novelty Co., 378 F.2d 1000, 1006 (8th Cir. 1967); NLRB v. Alva Allen
Industries, 369 F.2d 310, 316 (8th Cir. 1966). However, an exception of a kind was
created for multi-employer bargaining units m NLRB v. Sheridan Creations, Inc., 357
F.2d 245 (2d Cir. 1966). In the latter case, an employer was required to adhere to a
multi-employer agreement recognizmg a union since it had obtained the majority
support of employees in the overall unit, though not of the company's own employees;
the obligation to bargain arose from the employer's untimely withdrawal from the
unit after commencing recognition discussions.
31. See Maphis Chapman Corp. v. NLRB, 368 F.2d 298, 303 (4th Cir. 1966).
32. Id.
33. 376 F.2d 482, 487 (5th Cir. 1967).
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intent of the signatory employees to authorize representation was not
vitiated by the possible msrepresentation.34 The fourth and eighth cir-
cuits have arrived at essentially the same result, though -with a slight
variation in the arrangement of the General Counsel's burden, by mak-
ing the lack of a showing of objective intent in authorization card sign-
ing a partial determinant of the employer's good faith." The fourth cir-
cuit has also upheld the General Counsel's duty to comply with the bur-
den of proof requirement when a "good faith" defense is raised by the
employer, even when the employer has indisputably committed other
unfair labor practices aimed at dissipating the union's strength.3 6
Aside from casting doubt upon the efficacy of authonzation cards
as a true index of the wishes of a majority of employees, these decisions
graphically show the desire of the courts to avoid conflict with the
Garment Workers rule, in section 8(a) (5) non-election cases since a
violation would yield a different remedy than would be given under
the section by which the rule was formulated.3 7
Neither the Board nor the courts, however, have been as concerned
about avoiding theoretical conflicts with the Garment Workers rule
in section 8 (a) (5) cases when unfair labor practices have been found to
affect the outcome of a representation election. In such cases, where
the union had earlier requested recognition based on a showing of
34. Id. See generally NLRB v. Winn-Dixie Stores, 341 F.2d 750, 754 (6th Cir. 1965),
cert. denied, 382 U.S. 830 (1965).
35. See Crawford Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 386 F.2d 367 (4th Cir. 1967); NLRB v. Morris
Novelty Co., 378 F.2d 1000, 1006 (8th Cir. 1967) See also Lane Drug Co. v. NLRB,
391 F.2d 812, 820 (6th Cir. 1968), where the employer's claim of "good faith" doubt for
refusal to bargain was upheld in absolving hum of a §8(a) (5) charge even though
the union actually- possessed a slim majority when making its original bargaining
demand.
36. See NLRB v. S.S. Logan Packing Co., 386 F.2d 562 (4th Cir. 1967) wherein the
fourth circuit overruled a series of its earlier decisions which had held that authonza-
non cards furnish ample proof of majority representation. See, e.g., Bilton Insulation,
Inc. v. NLRB, 297 F.2d 141 (4th Cir. 1961); NLRB v. Greensboro Coca-Cola Bottling
Co., 180 F.2d 840 (4th Cit. 1950). See generally Note, Authorization Cards, 75 YALE
L.J. 805 (1966).
37. As further evidence of the court's desire not to allow §8(a) (5) remedies in non-
election cases to violate the policy of §8(a) (2) as expressed by the Garment Workers
rule, see also Garment Workers Local 57 v. NLRB, 374 F.2d 295, 299 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
There the court refused enforcement of a Board order attempting to force a "runaway
shop" employer to bargain with workers at a new plant 1,000 miles from the original
facility regardless of a lack of a umon majority at the new plant, the court expressed
the belief that:
Removing the benefit of the. employers' wrongdoing against the workers
at the old plant by infringing equally fundamental rights of employees
at the new plant is unjustified. Id.
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majority support, the Board's remedy generally includes an order di-
recting the employer to bargain, notwithstanding the union's later lack
of a majority as displayed in the election.
An illustrative case is Bernel Foam Products, Co.,38 where the operative
rationale is that the employer's unfair labor practices committed before
the election were responsible for the diminution of the union's ma-
jority strength and the loss of the election."
Several other decisions, however, show that the Bernel Foam excep-
tion is not absolute and that the Board has attempted to apply it in
view of the Garment Workers decision. Thus, the refusal of the Board
to order an employer to recognize a union which neither enjoyed
majority support at the time of its demand nor thereafter proceeded to
an election, despite the employer's commission of unfair labor prac-
tices,40 established some preconditions to the application of Be rnel Foam.
This is buttressed by the Board's refusal to order an employer to bargain
with a umon which enjoyed an actual majority at the time it made a
recognition demand and proceeded to an election, but failed to other-
%vise state a "meritorious claim" for relief.
41
Within these limits, Bernel Foam harmonizes well with other cases
under both section 8(a) (2) and section 8(a) (5) of the Act, which
together place restrictions on the Garment Workers rule by compelling
bargaining after recognition despite later loss of majority support. In-
cluded are cases in which the duty to bargain is based on antecedent cer-
38. 146 N.L.R.B. 1277 (1964), wherein the Board overruled an earlier line of de-
cisons starting with Aiello Dairy Farms, 110 NL.RB. 1365 (1954). Under the Aiello
rule, if the union gained knowledge of the employer's unfair labor practice before the
election, it was required to choose between two courses of conduct: it could bring an
unfair labor practice charge before the Board under the appropriate sub-section of
the Act, thus postponing the election pending disposition of the charge; or, alterna-
tively, it could proceed into the election thus waiving the opportunity to bring the
unfair labor practice charge and binding itself by the result of the election. See North
Electric Co., 129 N.L.R.B. 675, 676-77 (1960). Under the Bernel Foam rule, however,
the union may proceed into the election without waiving the right to bring unfair
labor charges thereafter. Thus, the union may now gain recognition, through a Board
order, despite the result of the election. See, e.g., NLRB v. Southbridge Sheet Metal
Works, Inc., 380 F.2d 851 (ist Cir. 1967); International Union of Elec. Workers v.
NLRB, 352 F.2d 361 (D.C. Cir. 1965), cert. dented, 382 U.S. 902 (1965); Colson Corp. v.
NLRB, 347 F.2d 128 (8th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 904 (1965).
39. J.P. Stephens and Co., 157 N.L.R.B. 869 (1966), mzodified on other grounds, 380
F.2d 292 (2d Cir. 1967).
40.. Wholesale Coop. Trucking Ass'n, 157 NJL.RB. 1572 (1966); Koplin Bros. Co.,
149.NJL.R.B. 1378 (1968).
41. Brooks v. NLRB, 348 U.S. 96 (1954); Hexton Furniture Co., 111 N.L.R.B. 342
(1955).
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ufication, 42 an order of the Board,43 settlement agreements, 4 and prior
voluntary acts of recognition." In all situations recognition is based upon
the conclusion that the union had earlier obtained majority support at
the time of its valid recognition demand.
In allowing Benel Foam and other related exceptions, the Board has
overlooked one basic element which creates a very real conflict with
the objectives of the Garment Workers rule. The union must stand on
a "meritorious claim" in seeking to achieve recognition through such
an order,46 which presumably means, inter alia, that it must have en-
joyed the support of a majority of employees at the time of its original
demand for recognition.47 The time span which may elapse between the
date such demand is made and the date the Board renders a decision
compelling recognition may be considerable." Thus, through normal
employee turnover the union's majority may have long since disap-
peared with no fault of the employer. This factor, rather than the
union's quest for recognition, coupled with the Act's policy of pro-
tectmg employees' freedom to choose a bargaining representative, or to
choose not to be represented by a collective bargaining agent at all, is
of utmost importance. Thus, even the carefully limited Bernel Foam
decision clearly establishes another departure from the spirit of the
Garment Workers rule.
THE STATUS OF "CoNDITIioNAL REPRESENTATION" AGREEMENTS
The impact of the Garment Workers rule has resulted in a change in
the Board's view of the legality of "conditional representation" agree-
ments, wherein the union is recognized by the employer on the condi-
tion that it later produce evidence of majority support before a bargain-
ing agreement may be executed or become effective. The validity of
such an arrangement was upheld by the Board against an alleged il-
legal assistance violation of section 8(a) (2) by the employer in Julius
42. Frank Bros. Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 702 (1944).
43. N.J. MacDonald & Sons, Inc., 155 N.L.R.B. 67 (1965).
44. Keller Plastics Eastern, Inc., 157 NL.R.B. 583 (1966)
45. See Irving Air Chute Co., 149 N.L.R.B. 627 (1964); but cf. Wholesale Coop.
Trucking Ass'n, 157 N.L.R.B. 1572 (1966).
46. See Bernel Foam Products Co., 146 NR.B. 1277 (1964). See also NLRB v.
Arkansas Grain Corp., 390 F.2d 824 (8th Cir. 1968).
47. Thus, m Aiello Dairy Farms, 110 NL,.R.B. 1365 (1954), the delay between the date
of respondent employer's refusal to bargain and the date of the Board's order was 26
months. In Bernel Foam Products, Co., 146 N..R.B. 1277 (1964), the delay amounted to
18 months.
48. Julius Resnick, Inc., 86 N.L.R.B. 38 (1949).
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Resmk, InC.4" There the conditional agreement was deemed merely
"precipitate," 50 the absence of a violation being predicated upon the
fact that the union had obtained a majority by the time the agreement
went into force. In the aftermath of the Garment Workers decision,
however, the Board turned what had been regarded as precipitous em-
ployer conduct into illegality, by finding a section 8 (a) (2) illegal as-
sistance violation for such employer conduct in Majestic Weaving Co.,51
Resnick was expressly overruled.
A close exammation of the dissimilar factual settings of the two
cases reveals that, while the result in Majestic necessarily dictated the
reversal of Resnick, such reversal was largely gratuitous to the Board's
rationale in Majestic. In Resnick, recognition was granted and a con-
tract prepared before the union actually began soliciting employee
support.5 2 Several months later, after the union had obtained majority
backing, the contract was formally executed by the parties and placed
into effect. In Majestic, however, after some solicitation had been car-
ried out by the union, the employer, though refusing recognition due
to the union's lack of majority status at the time, offered at the union's
request to discuss possible terms which might be included in an eventual
contract. The union then conducted a membership campaign among the
employees while discussions continued. The company later prepared a
draft of a contract, based on the discussions, and tendered it to the
union for exammation. After ascertaining the union's wish to execute
the contract, the employer was offered and accepted proof of the
union's majority status. The union was then recognized and the parties
executed the contract. Thus, unlike the factual development in Resnick,
recognition was never granted in Majestic until after the union had
proven the existence of its majority. Therefore, the employer's act of
extending exclusive recognition to a minority union, the precise act
condemned as an unfair labor practice by the Garment Workers rule,
never actually occurred in Majestic, either intentionally as in Resnick
or unintentionally as in Garment Workers. Also, in Majestic there was
no rival union attempting to contemporaneously organize wich would
have been prejudiced by the conditional agreement, as in Resnick.
49. Id. at 39.
50. Id.
51. 147 N.L.R.B. 859 (1964), enforcement refused on other grounds, 355 F.2d 854
(2d Cir. 1966).
52. 86 N.L.R.B. 38, 39 (1949). This type of conduct, mherently violative of §8(a) (2),
is known as "organizing from the top." See American Standard Cargo Container Co.,
151 N.L.R.B. 1399, 1408 (1965).
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Furthermore, since there was no actual premature recognition extended
by the employer in Majestic, there was no written agreement operative
to bind the parties at a time when the union lacked a majority, as
there was in both Resnick and Garment Workers. These distinctions
were observed, at least in part, by the trial examiner in his intermediate
report in Majestw, 3 but were ignored by the Board members who
wrote the final decision. Using the general statement in Garment Work-
ers that "section 9(a) guarantees employees freedom of choice and
majority rule" in selecting a bargaining representative, 54 the Board char-
acterized the bilateral dealings in Majestic as negotiations between a mi-
nority bargaining representative and an employer who was thereby
guilty of an unfair labor practice.Y5 In moving for enforcement of
the Majestic order in the second circuit, the board attempted to change
its earlier rationale by no longer insisting that the result was necessarily
dictated by the Garment Workers decision. The Board averred instead
that the premature grant of exclusive bargaining status to a union, even
if conditioned on the attainment of a majority before execution of a
contract, is similar to formal recognition "with respect to the deleterious
effect upon employee rights." 16 This approach would seem sufficiently
broad to cover a situation such as that in Majestic, and thus, a fortiori,
a set of circumstances approximating those in ResmckY It thus ap-
pears that the Board's disaffirmance of conditional representation con-
tracts, independent of assistance from the Garment Workers rule, is
certain. That s-ch a disavowal would doubtless wm acceptance in the
appellate courts can be observed in the dicta of the second circuit in
Majestic:
53 147 N.L.R.B. 859, 873 (1964).
54. 366 U.S. 731, 742 (1961)
55. 147 N.L.R.B. 859, 860 (1964).
56. 355 F.2d 854, 859 (2d Cir. 1966). See also 29 NLRB ANN. REP. 69 (1964).
57. See Allied Super Markets, Inc., 167 N.L.R.B. - (No. 48), 66 L.R.R.M. 1044
(1967). There, as in Resnik, an employer executed a mult-umt bargaining contract
with a union that possessed a valid majority at his primary place of business but only
a minority, on the date of contract execution, at a separate store considered within
the unit. Even though the union acquired a majority at the second store a short time
later, the Board held that another interested union could demand a representation
election since it filed its petition, under §9 of the Act, before the first union had
obtained a majority and thus before the conditional representation contract became
effective. This decision illustrates a possible remedy open to the Board in conditional
representation situations where a rival union is on the scene and acts in a timely




[R]ational basis exists for some such specification of the language
of Section 8(a) (2) even in cases like this where no other union
was on the scene when negotiations occurredP
THE VALIDITY OF "MEMBERS-ONLY" RECOGNITION
The enunciation of the Garment Workers rule also cast doubt upon
the continued efficacy of "members-only" agreements, found valid in
several early NLRB decisions.59 This doubt was raised by the Supreme
Court's approval of the Board's order enjoining the employer from
recognizing the union as the representative of "any of its employees." 6"
Indeed, the Board's opinion did not clarify the questionable status of
members-only agreements, which appear to have been defined out of
existence in the Board's unequivocal pronouncement that:
Employees have not only the right to be represented by a
majority representative but also the right to bargain independently
and individually vith their employer in the absence of a majority
representative."'
The Board further clouded the issue in a case decided after its opinion in
Garm7ent Workers, but before the-Supreme Court's decision therein,
by observing that the making of members-only agreements is permis-
sible in an abstract sense.62 Therefore, it may well be that the legality
of such agreements is dependent upon the circumstances surrounding
their inception. Decisions rendered in the few cases 'in point before
Garment Workers, and in several later cases tangential to the members-
only question, tend to bear out this assumption.
In Solvay Process Co.,6 3 while two rival unions competed for mem-
bership among the employees in his plant, the employer recognized one
on a members-only basis. This action was upheld by the Board in the
absence of proof of other section 8 (a) (2) violationssuch as management
domination of the union or prior acts showing favoritism to the union
ultimately given recognition. The Supreme Court extended this ap-
58. 355 F.2d 854, 859-60 (2d Cir. 1966).
59. The. Hoover Co., 90 N..R.B. 1614 (1950); Solvay Process Co., 5 N.L.R.B. 330
(1938); Consolidated Edison Co., 4 NL.R.B. 71 (1937).
60. Bernhard-Altmann Texas Corp., 122 NI.R.B. 1289, 1295 (1959), as quoted in
Garment Workers, 366 U.S. 731, 740 (1960) (Douglas, J, dissenting).
61. 122 N.L.R.B. 1289, 1292 (1959).
62. Alco-Gravure, Division of Publication Corp., 124 N.L.RB. 1027, 1029 (1959).
63. 5 NL.R.B. 330 (1938)
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proach in Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB6 4 by finding such rec-
ognition permissible, again in the absence of a showing of actual em-
ployer domination or assistance to the recognized union, even where
the employer had committed unfair labor practices violating other sec-
tions of the Act. The determinative fact in Edison was that these un-
fair labor practices were unrelated to the cirumstances of the recogm-
non agreement. Thus, the strong implication of these early decisions
is that the members-only contract is subject to invalidation only where
the employer dominates or gives actual assistance to the umon, and
that its negotiation may take place regardless of the concurrent organi-
zational efforts of rival unions. Neither those efforts nor the holding of
an election resulting from their success are barred. The Court upheld
this result in Edison, where the employer was a public utility-
Maintenance of the status of a minonty union, until an election
might well serve the purpose of protecting commerce from
interruptions and obstructions caused by industrial strife [since]
there shall be no interference with an exclusive bargaining
agency if one other than the [union] should be established in
accordance with the Act.66
The goal of avoiding industrial strife during organizational campaigns
was carried a step further by the Board in The Hoover Co 67 through
the suggestion that an employer, faced with recognition demands from
two or more competing unions, may validly grant recognition to each
on a members-only basis without violating the Board's Midwest Pipng
doctrine.68 The likelihood that this is the employer's most appropriate
response in such a situation is buttressed by several recent decisions
holding that, due to the unreliability of authorization cards in determim-
64. 305 U.S. 197 (1938).
65. See NLRB v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 303 U.S. 261, 267 (1938).
66. Garment Workers v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 731, 741-42 (1960) (Douglas, J, dissenting)
(quoting in part from Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 237-39 (1938)).
67. 90 N.L.R.B. 1614, 1618 (1950). See also Kearney & Trecker Corp, 113 N.L.R.B.
1145, 1149-50 (1955); Sunbeam Corp., 99 N.L.R.B. 546, 551 (1952); Electronics Equip-
ment Co, 94 N.L.R.B. 62, 63 (1951)
68. 63 N.L.R.B. 1060 (1945). Thus, the Midwest Piping doctrine, considered in light
of Edison and Hoover, holds that an employer violates §8(a) (2) of the Act only if,
during the pendency before the Board of a representation question involving two or
more unions, he grants exclusive recognition to one of the unions. This formulation was
limited by the sixth circuit in NLRB v. Standard Steel Spring Co., 180 F.2d 942 (6th
Cir. 1950), where it.,was held that an employer must extend recognition to one of
the competing unions in such a situation where proof of its majorit is "clear cut."
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ing majority status in multi-umon recognition campaigns, an employer
who grants exclusive recognition to one of the unions solely on the
basis of a showing of vaguely-worded authorization cards is guilty of
an unfair labor practice.69
Though these cases support the validity of members-only agreements,
the subsequent rendering of Garment Workers, coupled with the sev-
eral later opinions of the Board invalidating such agreements m light of
that decision, 70 and the absence of any post-Garment Workers judicial
or Board opinions upholding them could form a basis for concluding
that members-only agreements are now invalid. A closer examination
of Garment Workers does not, however, support this view The nu-
nority bargaining agreement in Garment Workers was of the exclusive
variety, as opposed to the members-only variety The Court fully
noted this distinction and expressly directed its condemnation only
toward the exclusive recognition clause in the contract, branding it "the
vice in the agreement." 71
When both the Garment Workers case and later Board opinions are
viewed in such a manner, it becomes apparent that, standing alone,
members-only agreements are often placed into bargaining contracts as
escape clauses and are intended to legitimate otherwise forbidden m-
nority exclusive representation. Thus, in Garment Workers, the Court
refused to give effect to a separability clause in the contract which
attempted to continue the agreement's existence as a members-only ar-
rangement should the dominant clause be invalidated. The Court ruled
that since the agreement was obtained due to the union's false and mis-
leading claim of majority support, the unlawful genesis of the agree-
ment precluded its partial validity12
The same reasoning was used by the Board when invalidating an at-
tempted members-only contract in Alco-Gravure,7" where the employer
unilaterally extended an exclusive bargaining contract past its expiration
date. An attempt was then made to modify this agreement in order to
continue recognizing the incumbent union on a members-only basis. The
members-only recognition was struck down not solely on its own merit,
but due to the Board's finding that it was inseparably connected with
69. NLRB v. S.S. Logan Packing Co., 386 F.2d 562, 569 (4th Cir. 1967); Nitro Super
Market, Inc., 161 N.L.R.B. 505, 515 (1966).
70. See Ellery Products Mfg. Co., 149 N.L.R.B. 1388 (1964); Alco-Gravure,Division
of Publication Corp., 124 N.LR.B. 1027 (1059)
71. 366 US. 731, 736-37 (1961).
72. Id.
73. 124 N.R.B. 1027, 1029 (1959).
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the prior expired contract in which- the union's exclusive agency was
thus tainted by its lack of uncoerced majority support. 4
Even though a-strong.argument stillexists in favor of the validity of
members-only recognition and bargaining agreements, the fact remains
that judicial and Board decisions focusing upon them are few One rea-
son for the paucity-of cases may be-that the making of such agreements
is now largely voluntary, on the part of employers, since organized la-
bor's privilege of using concerted action to pressure the employer into
such arrangements- has been sharply diluted due, inter alia, to the passage
of coercive picketing provisions contained in section 8 (b) (7) of the
Act.7 5 Moreover, the utiity of such agreements to unions may -at times
not seem worth the organizational, effort to gain what would often be
only a few added members, particularly in view of the fact that such
agreements are not a bar to subsequent elections and orgamzational cam-
paigns initiated by rival unions. Despite their apparent lack of use,
however, members-only agreements appear to have retained their- legal
vitality as long as they are not used to aid in masking either employer
dominance or the equivalent union deprivation of the freedom of the
majority of employees to select their own bargaining representatives.
A PROPOSAL
Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, expresses
the basis of our national labor policy as a desire to create and preserve
in employees the right of self-organization, including the freedom "to
bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing. ' 76
Further, a necessary corollary to the possession of this freedom by the
employees is that, when used on a mass scale, its exercise must be guided
by the principles of majority rule. Thus, the fairness of the Garment
Workers rule prohibiting the actions of a minority of employees to bind
all of their fellow workers in the selection of an exclusive bargaining rep-
resentative is readily apparent. The fairness of the remedies imposed in
certain situations under both section 8(a) (2) and section 8(a) (5), how-
ever, may actually be illusory in regard to the current wishes of a sub-
stantial number of employees. Whether or nor an election is involved,
the standard remedy in cases under section 8(a) (2) is a rather blunt
74. However, the Board gave the unqualified opinion that " members-only con-
tracts are permissible under the law." id.
75. 29 US.C. §158(b) (7) (1964)




punitive instrument, especially since the union, as a- consequence of its
commission of a section 8(b) (1) (A) violation, ceases to act as the rep-
resentative of all employees. "8 The remedy may, however, ignore the
subjective desires of the employees, many of whom -may wish to retain
the union as their bargaining representative, particurarly if the union
had not been under the actual control or domination- of the employer.
In a section 8 (a) (5) case where refusal to bargain charges are brought
after the union's loss of an election due to alleged unfair conduct of the
employer befoie the election, the result may often be even more destruc-
tive of the rights of employees. Through the remedial order compelling
management to bargain on an exclusive basis with the aggrieved union,
not only is a rather harsh penalty visited on the employer in conjunction
with an often undeserved windfall to the union, 79 but the wishes of
many, perhaps even a majority, of employees may be subrogated to
the union's victory Since the union's loss of majority support in the
period between the employer's commission of the unfair labor practice
and the Board's supposed rectification of the damage even where due
solely to the passage of time,"0 is generally thought irrelevant, the em-
ployees are left with no choice as between the victorious union and an-
other union, or between that union and a decision not to be represented
at all, a right guaranteed by section 7 of the Act.3' Thus the basic right
of employees to self-organization cannot be said to enjoy fair protection
in post-election cases arising under section 8 (a) (5) of the Act.
It is here suggested that more desirable remedies, aimed at protecting
primarily the employee's section 7 rights, should be adopted both in sec-
tion 8(a) (2) cases and in post-election section 8(a) (5) cases. Ac-
cordingly, it is suggested that in such situations the Board order that an
election be conducted at the earliest feasible time, so as to determine the
true wishes of the employees. Such an election should allow the em-
ployees in the proper bargaining unit to choose between:
1) The union acting as incumbent representative, in section 8(a)
(2) cases; or the umon which lost the unfair prior election in
8(a) (5) cases;
2) the union aggrieved, i.e., the charging party, in a section 8(a)
(2) case;
78. 29 U.S.C. §i58(b) (1) (A) (1958).
79. See Bernel Foam Products Co, 146 N.L.R.B. 1277 (1964).
80. Id. But cf. Josephine Furniture Co., 172 N.L.RJB. - (No. 22), 68 L.R.R.M.
1311 (1968)....
81. 29 US.G. §157 (1958).
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3) any other unon expressing an interest in organizing the em-
ployees in the.period between the date of the employer's unfair
labor practice and the date of the Board's decision (or alterna-
tively, between the date of the unfair labor practice and a
reasonable time before the election) in both section 8(a) (2)
and 8(a)(5) cases;82 and
4) no union.
It is acknowledged that the feasible length of time until an election
could be held may vary due to the difference m violations and in case-
by-case circumstances, being perhaps longer in section 8 (a) (2) cases of
employer domnation of the incumbent union. The end result, however,
would assure greater ultimate protection of employees' basic rights. An
additional short-run remedy should also be given in all cases- where no
finding of employer domination is made, in order to best assure protec-
tion of basic rights m the interim period.
Such a remedy would be to allow members-only agreements between
employers and interested employees, acting through the umons listed
above until an election is held. This would pernut a continuation of
some type of umon representation, where in the employees' judgment
its presence was warranted, without unfairly binding a possible majority
to acceptance of the union, which is a distinct possibility under the
existing remedy Such members-only recognition could also be utilized
where no union had obtained a majority, but one or more unions had
displayed considerable strength.
Further, members-only agreements in general should continue to en-
joy the sanction of labor relations law, where two conditions have been
met. First, the members-only contract's paramount aim must be to truly
provide for such recognition, and not to serve as a secondary exculpatory
contract clause aimed at allowing some form of representation where
minority exclusive representation classes are invalidated. Second, there
must be a lack of proof that the members-only union is under the actual
domination or control of the employer, and that it received actual as-
sistance from him in its organizational efforts.
As a means of securing the right of self-organization to the greatest
possible number of employees, it would be entirely feasible that mem-
82. Such a remedy could be a logical extension of that applied in the Garment
Workers case, where both employer and union were ordered to cease and desist
[uhtil (the umon) shall have demonstrated its exclusive majority repre-




bers-only recognition be made compulsory upon employers where
the showing of sufficient employee interest, short of majority support,
can be produced. This legal sanction would reduce the employer's
chance of mistakenly conferring exclusive recognition upon a minority
union, yet it would allow representation for many employees, on an in-
dividual basis, whose desires may be stifled due to the application of the
majority exclusivity requirement. Also, no hardship would be worked
on the majority of employees not desiring such organized representation.
As a guide to determining what would constitute a sufficient display
of interest in organized members-only recognition, an analogy could be
drawn from the Board's "representative complement" rule, which vali-
dates exclusive representation agreements executed at or after a time
when the employer has engaged thirty percent of his ultimate com-
plement of employees, who are at work in half or more of the number
of ultimate job categories. 3 Thus, the compelling of members-only rec-
ognition at the request of thirty percent of the employees in an ap-
propriate unit would allow effective representation to be provided to a
substantial number of employees, short of a majority, while not in-
fringing the rights of those not desiring such representation and not
burdening the employer by forcing him to negotiate with a union which
represents a nonsubstantial number of employees.
This change in recognition policy would not upset existing case law
and, more particularly, would not be prohibited by an application of the
Garment Workers rule which forbids only those agreements between
employers and minority unions that give the union exclusive representa-
tion status.
This view should also continue to prevail in situations where more
than one union is seeking recognition, within the limitations expressed
above. Members-only recognition in the midst of multi-umon orgamza-
tional contests has been expressly permitted in the Hoover case,84 which
was not disavowed in Garment Workers or any subsequent decisions.
The adoption of such a position would provide for continuity with
the Board's historic approach to minority uniomsm.: 5 Such a policy
would enable many working men, such as those employed in "white-
collar" occupations where the specter of unionism in a "professional'
83. See General Extrusion Co., 121 N-.LR.B. 1165 (1958).
84- 90 NJ,.RB. 1614 (1950).
85. See Garment Workers v. NLRB, 366 US. 731, 742 (1961), (Douglas J., dis-
sentng).
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atmosphere may conflict with the personal ideals of a majority of their
fellows, to enjoy the exercise of the basic right to self-organization.
Furthermore, the fostering of members-only recognition as an imme-
diate and expedient answer to representation problems should lead to the
placing of more reliance upon Board-conducted elections, 6 by both
unions and employers, as a means of determining exclusive recognition
rights. This would result in a more accurate determination of the wishes
of the majority of employees to the question of ultimate exclusive rep-
resentation. This expectation is based upon the interrelation of two
factors. First, the extension of members-only recognition does not now
create a bar to a labor election where an exclusive representative may be
named by majority vote.8 7 Second, the logical result of compulsory
members-only recognition should lead to the placing of far less reliance
upon the use of authorization cards, widely regarded as highly inaccurate
measurements of employee desires, 8 as a final means of determining
majority support for exclusive representation purposes, since a form of
representation status could be given to a union short of proof of majority
support.
Finally, in cases where conditional representation agreements are in-
validated, the allowance of members-only representation could also be an
appropriate remedy, one which would preserve the primacy of employee
rights by refraining from penalizing those employees desiring represen-
tation while still disestablishing an incumbent union and its invalid ex-
clusive bargaining statute.
However, the illegality of all conditional representation agreements
should not thus be broadly presumed. Such an assumption, while heavily
supported by the Board's decision and the appellate court's dicta in
Majestc,89 should nevertheless not be dispositive of the validity of all
such agreements. Though the Garment Workers rule would clearly
seem to apply in forbidding such agreements where concluded before
the union obtains a majority, and thereafter used by either the union
or the employer to coerce additional employees to affiliate with the
union and so taint its eventual majority, it should be recogmized that
this may not always be the result. Thus, where the employees are not
86. The administration of representation elections is governed by §9 of the Act.
29'U.S.C. §159 (1958).
87. See Consolidated Edison Co., 4 N.LR.B. 71, 79 (1937).
88. See Midwest Piping and Supply Co., 63 N.L.R.B. 1060 (1945). See also NLRB
v. Golub Corp., 388 F.2d 921 (2d Cit. 1967); NLRB v. Flomatic Corp, 347 F.2d 74 (2d
Cit. 1965).
89. 147 N.L.R.B. 859, 861 (1964).
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informed of such agreements before the union attains a majority, and
where, as m Majestic, the employer not only refrains from executing
an exclusive bargaining contract but also withholds the granting of rec-
ognition until the union proves its majority status, there can be no pos-
sibility that the employees were coerced and that the union's later at-
tainment of majority support was anything but a legitmate expression of
employee wishes. Indeed, it would be at least theoretically possible for a
company to contemporaneously negotiate-such conditional agreements
with several unions attempting to win recognition. In examining the
validity of conditional representation agreements, therefore, the Board
and the courts should seek to determine whether these noncoercive
elements are present in the history of the formation of the agreement,
and decide accordingly Consequently, where such conditional represent-
ation agreements may be found nonviolative in the absence of coercive
circumstances, they could serve as a stimulant to the expediting of the
collective bargaining process by reducing both the time consumed and
the range of issues dealt with in negotiations.
Through the adoption of these suggestions, the admmistration of labor
relations could be more viably geared to foster optimum possibilities
for increasing the effective exercise of employees' basic right to self-
organization within this framework, the Garment Workers rule would
stand unabated as a protective measuring stick to be used in nvalidat-
ing attempts at deprivations of this right by the self-serving actions of
-unions and employers.
JOHN C. SOURS
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